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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1960

ordinance and of a state law. The court dealt only with the situation
where the defendant is charged with violation of a municipal ordinance
alone. When the proper case arises, i.e., one in which the defendant
is charged in municipal court with both violations, the court may hold
that under these circumstances a police court can, upon conviction of
either charge, revoke or suspend a driver's license under RCW
46.20.080.
In summary, the present status of the law is that a municipal court
cannot revoke or suspend a motor vehicle operator's license upon
conviction of violation of a municipal ordinance alone under either
RCW 46.56.010 or RCW 46.20.280. A municipal court can suspend
a license upon conviction of violation of a state statute regulating use
of the highway under RCW 46.08.190. Where the defendant is
charged and convicted of violation of a municipal ordinance, and the
same act done by the defendant is violative of both an ordinance and
a state statute, but no charge is made based upon the statute, the
Schampera case must be taken to say that the municipal court cannot
revoke or suspend the driver's license. Where the defendant is charged
with the violation of both an ordinance and a statute, but is convicted
only of the violation of the ordinance, it is an open question whether
or not a municipal court can deprive him of his driver's license.

C. DAVID

SHFPPAU

PLEADING, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE
Abolition of the Show Cause Order. Are Washington practitioners
wasting their own time and their clients' money? It may be that some
are by following procedure not contemplated by the new Rules of
Pleading, Practice, and Procedure.
This observation is occasioned by the recently decided case of
Dlouly v. Dlouhy.1 The case arose out of a petition to vacate a default
divorce decree taken by the wife. The petition was grounded upon
lack of notice.
Upon initiating the proceedings, the wife obtained, ex parte, a temporary restraining order prohibiting the husband from selling or encumbering the property, and an order directing the husband to show
cause why the restraining order should not be converted to a temporary
injunction pendente lite, and why he should not be ordered to vacate
the home. No answering affidavits were entered, but on the return day
55 Wn2d 718, 349 P2d 1073 (1960).
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of the order the husband appeared in court, without counsel, and successfully defended to the extent that he was not required to vacate the
home. The plaintiff wife subsequently filed a motion and affidavit for
an order of default, and later obtained an uncontested decree of divorce. Defendant husband was given no notice of these proceedings
and took no action other than his personal appearance in court in response to the show cause order.
There was no question but that in personam jurisdiction had been
obtained over the husband by the service of summons and complaint;
the question was whether his response to the show cause order was
such a voluntary participation in the case as to indicate his appearance and willingness to defend and, therefore, to entitle him to notice of
motions and other proceedings in the case.
The court held that the husband's presence at the hearing and his
argument against the entry of the order was such a voluntary act as to
constitute a common law appearance and, therefore, entitled the defendant to such notice. Had the court held otherwise, it would have
had to base its holding upon a finding that the show cause order
required the physical presence of the defendant or his counsel.
For the purposes of this Note, the important facet of the case is the
court's holding that the husband's response to the show cause order
was voluntary.
Since such a response is voluntary, there is no distinction between
the legal effect of an order to show cause and an ordinary notice motion. The difference lies in procedure.
Stripped to its essence, the show cause order procedure requires
that, upon affidavits filed in support thereof, the order be signed by
the court, filed, and a certified copy be obtained and served personally
upon the adverse party, following which argument on the merits will
be heard on the return day.' The noticed motion procedure requires
only that the motion for the requested relief, supported by affidavits,
together with a notice of the hearing thereof, be given to the adverse
party or his representative, similarly followed by argument on the
merits on the day noted for the hearing.
In theory, the noticed motion procedure would seem to be the only
course authorized in divorce,' or other proceedings4 by the Washington
Rules of Pleading, Practice, and Procedure.
-

See TOWNE, WASHINGTON PRACTICE § 1087 (1956).
3 RCW 26.08.140: "The practice in civil action shall govern all proceedings in the
trial of actions for divorce. ..."
2

4 An

exception to this general statement is provided by
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Rule 7(b) (1) directs that "an application to the court for an order
shall be by motion .... "I Although the show cause order is still widely
used in divorce and injunction proceedings, it is not a motion and
would not seem to be within the ambit of the quoted rule.
A further argument for the point that the rules do not authorize the
show cause procedure is found by reference to history. This procedure
has been used by the courts for literally centuries. Yet, the supreme
court has omitted any mention of it in the general rule, Rule 7,6 but has
provided for its use in a specific instance, vacation of a judgment, Rule
60.04W. By the canons of statutory construction, use of the show
cause procedure should then be restricted to the specific instance mentioned. This general exclusion but specific inclusion, viewed against
the historical background of use, would seem to allow but one viewthat the court's failure to make provision for the show cause procedure
was deliberate.
In practice, the disadvantage of the show cause order lies in the
time-consuming process of securing the signature of the court prior to
service. Especially is this true in the more populous counties. A second disadvantage arises when the request for temporary relief is made
after the service of summons and complaint. A copy of the order and
affidavit in support thereof must be certified and personally served
upon the defendant. Thus, a fee, in addition to that already paid for
the service of the summons and complaint, must be paid. Utilization
of the show cause procedure adds to the plaintiff's costs the expense of
the time spent in securing the signature, the cost of certification, and,
occasionally, an extra fee to the process server.
Petitioning the court to grant the desired order by means of the
noticed motion eliminates these undesirable economic results and timeconsuming procedures.
There is, however, an aspect of the show cause procedure which
may be desirable to retain. Although the court has said that the response to the show cause order is voluntary, this is undoubtedly not
the impression conveyed to the average recipient of such an orderto him it is an order, signed by a judge, directing him to appear. There
is a strong practical coercion to appear.
PRAcriCE, PROcEuJRE 60.04W, which authorizes a show cause order in an action for the

vacation of a judgment It is, of course, possible that this discrepancy is a mere oversight by the court. Another possible exception is noted in the principal case, dealing
"
contempt proceedings. 55 Wn2d 718, 722, 349 P.2d 1073, 1075 (1960).
with
5
WAsH., RuLEs, PLFADING, PRACTICF, PaocEDun 7(b) (1).
SIbid.
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Where desired, this practical coercion can be transferred to the noticed motion simply by appending to the notice a warning, as strongly
worded as necessary, to the effect that an order may be entered at the
hearing which will bind the notice recipient under pain of contempt of
court for failure to obey. In this way the noticed motion can assume
the desirable aspects of the show cause order while doing away with
the practical disadvantages. There remains little, if any, reason for
retaining the show cause order procedure.
In summary, the show cause order has no more legal coercive effect
as the show cause order, it eliminates the ex parte hearing, and is a less
complex procedural device. Abandonment of the show cause order,
with the two noted exceptions,' would seem to be amply justified.
C. DAVID SHEPPARD

TORTS
Warrantless Arrest. The Washington Supreme Court in the case of
Plancick v. Williamson,' has indicated that the police of this state will
receive judicial protection in suits instituted by private individuals because of arbitrary and unreasonable police action. In the Plancich
case, the court sustained the right of the police to arrest a citizen of
this state without a warrant, on the barest of circumstances supporting the police contention that there was probable cause for the arrest.
The Plancich case is more remarkable than other decisions of the
court on this point, since neither the court nor the police department
could decide if the facts which were relied upon to support a warrantless arrest of the suspect justified a suspicion that he had committed
a felony, or that he was dangerously insane. It is submitted that the
following facts, upon which the court and the police department relied, support neither contention.
About 10:30 one Sunday evening, Jerry Plancich, father of Louis
Plancich, the plaintiff, came into the Olympia Police Station, and in
very erratic and broken English told the acting desk sergeant that his
son, armed with two guns, a small one and a big one, had knocked on
his bedroom door and threatened to kill him. Acting upon the complaint, the sergeant and one other officer went to the Plancich home.
The officers knocked on the door but received no response. They then
looked through a window and observed Louis Plancich sitting at a
7 Note 4 supra.
1 157 Wash. Dec. 265, 357 P.2d 693 (1960).

